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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
It is well established that a federal court has a duty to 
assure itself that the persons invoking its power have standing 
to do so under Article III of the Constitution. That principle 
applies even to putative intervenors of right under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), who must demonstrate 
constitutional standing for each claim they wish to bring if the 
claim would result in relief different from that which the 
plaintiff seeks. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. 
Ct. 1645 (2017). 
In this case, the District Court ruled on the merits of a 
Rule 24 motion by three Pennsylvania state senators before 
considering fully whether the Senators need to establish Article 
III standing for either of their two proposed claims. Because 
we conclude that on each of those claims the Senators appear 
to be seeking relief different from that sought by the plaintiff, 
and that the District Court is best positioned to decide this 
question in the first instance, we will vacate the District Court’s 
order and remand for consideration of whether the Senators 





The underlying dispute in this case is not new to our 
Court. See Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River 
Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2018) (Wayne I). 
Nevertheless, some account of that dispute is necessary for 
adequate disposition of the present appeal. 
A 
In late 1961, concurrent legislation in Congress and the 
states of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania 
adopted into law the Delaware River Basin Compact.1 That 
agreement was designed in part to centralize and coordinate 
among the states “the planning, conservation, utilization, 
development, management and control of the water resources 
of the basin.” Delaware River Basin Compact § 1.3(e) (1961), 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/compact.pdf.2 
To this end, the Compact created an interstate agency, the 
Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), and delegated to 
it several powers. Among those powers is the authority to 
review and approve any “project having a substantial effect on 
the water resources of the basin.” Id. § 3.8. The scope of this 
power in turn depends upon the definition of two terms. First, 
the Compact defines “project” as 
 
1 Under the Federal Constitution, a state may “enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State” only with “the 
Consent of Congress.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. As a result, 
the Compact is federal law. See Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 
688 (1961). 
2 The Basin is defined as “the area of drainage into the 
Delaware River and its tributaries, including Delaware Bay.” 




any work, service or activity which is separately 
planned, financed, or identified by the 
commission, or any separate facility undertaken 
or to be undertaken within a specified area, for 
the conservation, utilization, control, 
development or management of water resources 
which can be established and utilized 
independently or as an addition to an existing 
facility, and can be considered as a separate 
entity for purposes of evaluation. 
Id. § 1.2(g). Second, it defines “water resources” as 
“includ[ing] water and related natural resources in, on, under, 
or above the ground, including related uses of land, which are 
subject to beneficial use, ownership or control.” Id. § 1.2(i). 
Despite these definitions, the extent of the DRBC’s 
review-and-approval authority remains uncertain, and that 
uncertainty lies at the heart of the underlying dispute in this 
case. In 2009, the then-Executive Director of the DRBC, Carol 
R. Collier, invoked § 3.8 to regulate horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, in the Basin. Concerned that 
these activities “if not properly performed may cause adverse 
environmental effects, including on water resources,” Collier 
issued a “Determination” giving “notice to natural gas 
extraction project sponsors that they may not commence any 
natural gas extraction project located in shale formations 
within the drainage area of Special Protection Waters without 
first applying for and obtaining [DRBC] approval.” Del. River 
Basin Comm’n, Determination of the Executive Director 
Concerning Natural Gas Extraction Activities in Shale 
Formations Within the Drainage Area of Special Protection 





09.pdf.3 A “project” was in turn said to “encompass[] the 
drilling pad upon which a well intended for eventual 
production is located, all appurtenant facilities and activities 
related thereto and all locations of water withdrawals used or 
to be used to supply water to the project.” Id. Collier later 
extended this regulation to “projects intended solely for 
exploratory purposes.” Del. River Basin Comm’n, 
Supplemental Determination of the Executive Director 
Concerning Natural Gas Extraction Activities in Shale 
Formations Within the Drainage Area of Special Protection 





Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC owns 
approximately 180 acres of land in Wayne County, 
Pennsylvania. Nestled in the northeastern part of the state, the 
county shares with New York a border shaped by the 
serpentine course of the upper Delaware River and its western 
branch. Wayne purchased the property to access, via fracking, 
valuable natural-gas reserves within the underground shale-
 
3 The “Special Protection Waters” cover “the entire 197-mile 
non-tidal Delaware River from Hancock, N.Y. to Trenton, 
N.J.” Special Protection Waters (SPW), Del. River Basin 
Commission (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/quality/spw.html. 
4 The parties dispute how to refer to these guidance documents. 
In particular, the Senators refer to them collectively as the 
“moratorium” or “de facto moratorium” on fracking in the 





rock formations that have come to characterize this region. 
However, because some of the land also lies within the Basin, 
Wayne’s intended fracking activities are subject to the 
DRBC’s claimed authority under the 2009 and 2010 
Determinations. 
In May 2016, Wayne sued the DRBC in federal court, 
challenging the agency’s authority to regulate the company’s 
proposed fracking activities. In particular, Wayne sought a 
declaration that “the [DRBC] does not have jurisdiction over, 
or the authority to review and approve, . . . [Wayne’s] proposed 
well pad, appurtenant facilities or the related activities to be 
carried out” on its property. JA99. Wayne argued that its 
proposed well pad “does not constitute a ‘project’ under 
Section 3.8 of the Compact,” and that, as a result, it was not 
subject to the DRBC’s claimed project-review authority. JA97. 
Several outside parties immediately sought to intervene 
in the action under Rule 24. The Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network and its leader, Maya K. van Rossum (collectively, the 
Riverkeeper), were permitted to do so in September 2016 on 
behalf of the DRBC. About a month later, Pennsylvania State 
Senators Joseph B. Scarnati III, Gene Yaw, and Lisa Baker also 
sought to intervene, but on the side of Wayne. Acting in their 
official capacities, the Senators asserted that the “DRBC is 
nullifying the General Assembly’s lawmaking power by 
effectively countermanding the directives of duly enacted laws 
that permit” various fracking-related activities. JA107. The 
Senators sought “to protect the authority and legislative 
prerogative of the Pennsylvania Senate and the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly to regulate commercial activities in 
Pennsylvania.” JA108. They did not specify the relief they 
sought, however, saying only that “they intend to adopt in 





Both the DRBC and the Riverkeeper opposed the 
Senators’ motion. Among other arguments, the Riverkeeper 
contended that the Senators lacked standing to intervene 
because they could not meet any of the three elements 
established in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560-61 (1992). The District Court denied the Senators’ motion 
without discussing the Riverkeeper’s standing argument. 
Rather, it held on the merits that the Senators had failed to 
establish all the conditions necessary for intervention of right 
under Rule 24(a), and it likewise declined to permit the 
Senators to intervene under Rule 24(b). 
A few months later, the District Court granted the 
DRBC’s motion to dismiss. It rejected the agency’s arguments 
regarding ripeness, standing, final agency action, and 
exhaustion, but nevertheless dismissed the action sua sponte, 
declaring it “apparent that [Wayne’s] proposed activities 
within the Delaware River Basin constitute a ‘project’ within 
the meaning of that term as defined in Sections 1.2(g) and 
1.2(i) of the Compact.” JA296. 
Wayne appealed. Our Court upheld the District Court’s 
decision regarding the DRBC’s arguments, but concluded that 
“the District Court erred when it decided that the 
Commission’s project review authority under the terms of the 
Compact unambiguously includes Wayne’s proposed 
activities.” Wayne I, 894 F.3d at 533. We remanded for further 
fact-finding as to the Compact drafters’ intent, cautioning that 
our opinion should not be read as “adopting or endorsing either 
Wayne’s interpretation or the [DRBC]’s, or anyone else’s.” Id. 
On remand, the Senators again sought to intervene. This 
time, they presented a unique proposed complaint, articulating 
two grounds for relief. In Count I, they requested that the 




its further enforcement,” JA424, arguing that it “violates the 
terms of the Compact because it exceeds the scope of authority 
ceded to the [DRBC] under the Compact,” JA421. 
Alternatively, in Count II, the Senators requested an order that 
the DRBC “provide just compensation for the deprivation of 
the economic value of the property in question.” JA424. 
According to the Senators, even if the Determinations are a 
valid exercise of the DRBC’s authority, they nevertheless 
constitute “a regulatory taking without just compensation” 
under the Fifth Amendment. JA422. 
The DRBC and the Riverkeeper again opposed the 
Senators’ attempt to intervene. This time, however, neither 
party contended that the Senators lack standing, resting their 
arguments chiefly on the merits of the Senators’ motion. The 
District Court agreed, denying the motion because the Senators 
had not shown a “significantly protectable interest in th[e] 
litigation.” JA41. The Senators timely appealed. 
II5 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the 
question of Article III standing as a “threshold” issue. See, e.g., 
Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 
(2019); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018); Horne 
v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). It is an “irreducible 
constitutional minimum,” without which a court would not 
have jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the action. Lujan, 504 
 
5 The District Court’s and our jurisdiction is at issue here, and 
“it is familiar law that a federal court always has jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction.” In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 
855 F.3d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 




U.S. at 560. As a result, federal courts “have an obligation to 
assure [them]selves of litigants’ standing under Article III.” 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as we 
have put it, “[o]ur continuing obligation to assure that we have 
jurisdiction requires that we raise [the] issue[] of standing . . . 
sua sponte.” Seneca Res. Corp. v. Township of Highland, 863 
F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). We must “assess our own appellate 
jurisdiction in the first instance.” Id. 
These principles apply even when an individual seeks 
to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). In this context, as in any 
other, standing is a “threshold issue.” Town of Chester, 137 S. 
Ct. at 1648. “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each 
claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is 
sought.” Id. at 1650 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)). As a result, if a putative intervenor 
of right “seeks additional relief beyond that which the plaintiff 
requests,” then the intervenor “must demonstrate Article III 
standing.” Id. at 1651. “Absent such a showing, exercise of its 
power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus 
inconsistent with the Art. III limitation.” Id. at 1650 (quoting 
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). 
The District Court in the present case therefore had a duty, 
before passing on the merits of the Senators’ motion to 
intervene, to determine whether the Senators must demonstrate 
Article III standing—whether, that is, they seek relief 
“different from that which” Wayne requests. Id. at 1651. 
To be sure, in its denial of the Senators’ second motion 
to intervene, the District Court did briefly confront this issue, 
though not as a threshold inquiry but rather as part of its ruling 
on the merits of the motion. The Senators, it noted, failed to 




their [Proposed] Complaint presents.” JA36 (brackets in 
original). The District Court distinguished between the two 
counts of the Senators’ complaint. “It may be true,” the District 
Court wrote, “that the relief sought in [Wayne’s] Complaint is 
sufficiently similar to the relief sought in Count I of the 
[Senators’] [Proposed] Complaint that the Senators need not 
meet the standing criteria for that claim.” JA36 (third brackets 
in original) (citations omitted). But as to Count II, “it is clear 
that the Senators seek relief that is broader than” that requested 
by Wayne. JA37 (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted). As a result, the District Court, citing Town of 
Chester, concluded that the Senators had failed to show “that 
they are not required to satisfy standing criteria to support their 
claim for intervention as of right.” JA37. Yet, despite this 
conclusion, the District Court provided no further elaboration 
on the standing issue. 
III 
Our review of the record indicates that, on both counts 
of their proposed complaint, the Senators appear to be seeking 
relief different from6 that sought by Wayne. We will discuss 
each count in turn. 
 
6 We clarify here at the outset that under Town of Chester, 
“different from” does not necessarily mean entirely different 
from. “For all relief sought, there must be a litigant with 
standing”; a putative intervenor of right is therefore required to 
demonstrate Article III standing not only in cases where the 
relief it seeks is categorically distinct from that sought by the 
plaintiff, but also in cases where the intervenor “seeks 
additional relief beyond that which the plaintiff requests.” 137 





As to the relief requested in Count I, the Senators 
emphasize the District Court’s observation regarding its 
similarity to the relief sought by Wayne. But they offer no 
further reasoning as to why this observation is correct, 
considering it “plain[]” that standing is “not at issue with 
regard to the first count.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4. 
The issue is not as clear as the Senators suggest.7 Their 
proposed complaint provides differing formulations of the 
relief they seek. For example, in their prayer for relief, the 
Senators “respectfully request that this Court invalidate the de 
facto moratorium and enjoin its further enforcement.” JA424; 
see also JA423. Elsewhere, though, they suggest that they want 
only declaratory relief under Count I. See, e.g., JA415, 422. 
Perhaps recognizing the problematic nature of their prayer for 
relief,8 the Senators emphasize this latter formulation in their 
 
7 Apart from all else, the District Court’s statement is hardly 
definitive. It said only that it “may” be true that the relief 
sought by Wayne is “sufficiently” similar to the relief sought 
under Count I of the Senators’ proposed complaint. JA36. 
8 There are two problematic aspects in particular. First, there is 
no indication that Wayne has requested injunctive relief. So if 
such relief is an essential part of Count I, then the Senators—
whose very statement distinguishes between declaratory and 
injunctive relief—must demonstrate Article III standing as to 
that claim. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974) 
(“Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an 
alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction.”); Alli v. 
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[D]eclaratory 
relief will not always be the functional equivalent of injunctive 
relief.”). Second, an invalidation of the 2009 and 2010 




reply brief: “As it relates to Count I, the redress or benefit the 
Senators seek is a declaration that, under the Compact, the 
[DRBC] lacks authority to institute a moratorium within the 
Basin.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 3 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that 
the Senators seek declaratory relief alone. 
There are two aspects of the request worth noting. First, 
it appears to challenge the DRBC’s authority under not simply 
§ 3.8 of the Compact—the invoked basis for the 2009 and 2010 
Determinations—but any provision of the Compact. See also, 
e.g., JA415 (“The Senators seek a declaration [from] this Court 
that the Delaware River Basin Compact . . . does not confer 
 
concerning final agency action. The DRBC argued there that 
the suit should be dismissed because the agency had not 
reached a final decision on whether to block Wayne’s proposed 
activities. After noting that the doctrine of final agency action 
usually applies only under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
we observed that “the question Wayne poses is not really one 
of administrative law at all.” 894 F.3d at 525. “Wayne is not 
asking for a review of an agency’s action. Wayne’s complaint 
does not seek to invalidate [the Determinations].” Id. Instead, 
we pointed out, Wayne is seeking a declaratory judgment on a 
question of law: whether the term “project” under the Compact 
covers its proposed activities. Id. at 525-26. According to the 
Senators’ prayer for relief, however, invalidation of the 
Determinations is precisely what they seek. Therefore, to the 
extent the Senators wish to reframe the relief Wayne requests, 
they are changing the nature of this action—rendering it one of 
administrative law rather than of contract interpretation. If that 
is the case, then the Senators need to establish Article III 
standing because they would in effect be pressing a distinct 




jurisdiction on the Commission to implement or otherwise 
enforce the moratorium.”). Second, the request challenges the 
DRBC’s authority to institute a moratorium on fracking 
activities within the Basin. The Senators therefore seem to 
want a declaration not simply that the DRBC may not review 
Wayne’s proposed fracking activities, but that it may not 
review any firm’s fracking activities. 
With these points in mind, we must now consider more 
specifically Wayne’s requested relief. In its broadest 
formulation, this relief would be a declaration: 
that the [DRBC] does not have jurisdiction over, 
or the authority to review and approve, or to 
require [Wayne] to seek prior approval from the 
[DRBC] for, or to otherwise preclude the 
development of, [Wayne’s] proposed well pad, 
appurtenant facilities or the related activities to 
be carried out on the Property. 
JA99. At first glance, this request could encompass more than 
a challenge to the DRBC’s claimed authority in the 2009 and 
2010 Determinations, bringing it, in that respect, in line with 
the Senators’ requested relief. Nevertheless, there are two ways 
in which it seems different from the relief the Senators seek. 
First, the language tracks that of the 2009 
Determination. In claiming review authority over “any natural 
gas extraction project,” Executive Director Collier added that 
“[f]or this purpose a project encompasses the drilling pad upon 
which a well intended for eventual production is located, all 
appurtenant facilities and activities related thereto and all 
locations of water withdrawals used or to be used to supply 
water to the project.” 2009 Determination at 2. The suggestion 
(in a sense confirmed by the subsequent course of the 




specifically concerned with the 2009 and 2010 Determinations, 
and therefore with the DRBC’s project-review authority under 
§ 3.8 of the Compact, rather than with all of the DRBC’s 
authority under the Compact. It is thus possible that, even if 
Wayne prevailed, the result would nullify only the 
Determinations’ claimed basis of authority, leaving open the 
possibility that the DRBC might in the future exercise 
alternative authority to regulate fracking in the Basin. See 
Wayne I, 894 F.3d at 530 n.17 (emphasizing that “[w]e take no 
position on whether [any other provision of the Compact] 
provides the [DRBC] an alternative jurisdictional basis to 
require advance approval of fracking activity”). 
Second, Wayne’s requested relief refers specifically to 
Wayne, rather than to any fracking firm. At the very least, this 
raises factual issues regarding the precise nature of Wayne’s 
proposed activities, the aspects of those activities that (should 
Wayne prevail) fall outside the scope of the DRBC’s 
regulatory authority, and whether a declaration as to those 
aspects would in effect constitute a declaration that the DRBC 
lacks the authority to review the proposed fracking activities of 
any other firm. The Senators, as noted, are not concerned with 
just Wayne’s problems: they appear to be looking to bar the 
DRBC from interfering with the fracking activities of any firm 
in the Basin. If so, and if Wayne’s requested relief is specific 
to it, then the Senators must indeed establish Article III 
standing as to Count I. 
B 
As the District Court acknowledged, Count II of the 
Senators’ proposed complaint clearly demands different relief. 
On appeal, the Senators make an interesting argument that in 
effect Count II resolves into Count I under the canon of 




declaration that the Compact cannot be interpreted as 
conferring the broad power claimed by the [DRBC] because 
the exercise of such authority would violate the United States 
Constitution, rendering the entire contract illegal.” Appellants’ 
Reply Br. at 5. Yet this neglects the very point at issue—the 
nature of the relief sought. In their proposed complaint, the 
Senators specifically request an order “directing the [DRBC] 
to afford just compensation for the diminution of the economic 
value of the property it has appropriated.” JA423. Wayne, by 
contrast, has sought only declaratory relief. The Senators must 
therefore establish Article III standing as to Count II of their 
proposed complaint. 
IV 
Although this conclusion might recommend that we 
next consider whether the Senators in fact have standing at 
least as to Count II, we nevertheless think it appropriate to 
remand the entire case to the District Court. The Senators’ 
arguments regarding that Count imply that the real goal of their 
intervention lies with Count I. In Town of Chester, the Supreme 
Court vacated and remanded because of an “ambiguous record 
and the lack of a reasoned conclusion on [the standing] 
question from” the lower court. 137 S. Ct. at 1652 n.4; see also 
Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 693 F. App’x 69, 70 
(2d Cir. 2017) (“[R]esolving the ambiguity identified by the 
Supreme Court is likely to require a factual inquiry that this 
Court lacks the institutional capacity to perform.”). The same 
two grounds apply here. The Senators insist that Count I seeks 
only a declaration that the DRBC lacks the authority under any 
provision of the Compact to regulate or bar fracking activities 
in the Basin. Wayne might also be seeking such relief, but it is 
at the very least unclear if a ruling for Wayne would apply to 
the entire Compact rather than just § 3.8, and if it would 




We think the District Court is best positioned to resolve 
these questions, and any others that might appear, in the first 
instance. Having overseen the litigation from the beginning, it 
is most familiar with the unique circumstances of the case and 
how they inform the nature of the relief sought. With the 
standing issue squarely before it, the District Court should have 
the opportunity to “offer the first word.” Nutraceutical Corp. 
v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 717 (2019); see also Frank v. Gaos, 
139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) (per curiam) (vacating and 
remanding for the lower courts to resolve “the standing 
question . . . in the first instance”); Cudjoe ex rel. Cudjoe v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 426 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(remanding for the district court “to address the standing issues 
in the first instance,” where standing was briefed by the parties 
on appeal but not addressed by the district court). 
V 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
